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NSPWG Report
Abstract
An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was
chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for
the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program. These
recommendations, which are contained in this report, should facilitate the
implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG
has recommended a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the
development and implementation of the SEI nuclear propulsion safety program.
In addition, the NSPWG has reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and
recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these
issues. These recommendations should be useful for the development of the
program's top-level requirements for safety functions (referred to as Safety
Functional Requirements). The safety requirements and guidelines address the
following topics: reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and
exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground
testing, and other considerations.
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Executive Summary
Nuclear propulsion has been identified as an essential technology for the
successful implementation of the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). Interagency
(NASA, DOE, and DOD) workshops were held in the summer of 1990 to
explore the options, issues, and requirements for the development of nuclear
propulsion systems in support of SEI. The workshop participants recognized the
vital importance of safety to a nuclear propulsion program and recommended
the formation of an interagency working group to formulate a sound safety
policy for SEI nuclear propulsion. Such a group, named the Nuclear Safety
Policy Working Group (NSWPG), was chartered in the fall of 1990 to develop
and recommend a top-level nuclear safety policy. This working group was also
asked to develop recommendations for a number of specific nuclear propulsion
safety topics. The recommendations of the working group are presented in this
document. The NSPWG recommendations apply only to the present scope of
planned SEI nuclear propulsion activities. Consistent and thorough application
of these recommendations should provide reasonable assurance that launch
approval can be obtained.
E.1 Recommended _tfet_Policv
The safety policy recommended by the NSPWG establishes the importance
and priority that must be placed on safety and establishes the broad framework
and overall guiding principles for the development and implementation of an
effective nuclear propulsion safety program. The recommended policy
statement is provided below and is discussed in Subsection 2.2.
Ensuring safety is a paramount objective of the Space Exploration
Initiative nuclear propulsion program; all program activities shall be
conducted in a manner to achieve this objective. The fundamental
program safety philosophy shall be to reduce risk to levels as low as
reasonably achievable. In conjunction with this philosophy, stringent
design and operational safety requirements shall be established and
met for all program activities to ensure the protection of individuals
and the environment. These requirements shall be based on applicable
regulations, standards, and research.
A comprehensive safety program shall be established. It shall
include continual monitoring and evaluation of safety performance and
shall provide for independent safety oversight. Clear lines of
authority, responsibility, and communication shall be established and
maintained. Furthermore, program management shall foster a safety
consciousness among all program participants and throughout all
aspects of the nuclear propulsion program.
ix
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E.2 Reauirements and Guidelines Recommended for Fiieht Safety
In addition to this safety policy, the NSPWG has recommended top-level
flight safety requirements and guidelines. These recommended requirements
and guidelines should be used by SEI program safety management to develop
the program's top-level requirements for safety functions, referred to as Safety
Functional Requirements. The recommended requirements and guidelines
should be useful for the purpose of conceptual design and program planning.
In comparison with the safety requirements, the safety guidelines are more in
the nature of suggestions or specific programmatic guidance; they are more
tentative than the safety requirements. These guidelines may be used to help
formulate Safety Functional Requirements as more information becomes
available.
E.2.1 Recommended Safety Requirements
Recommended safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up,
inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and
safeguards. Both quantitative and qualitative requirements were recommended.
Quantitative requirements for radiological exposures were recommended only
when applicable established guidance could be cited. (Qualitative terms are
defined in the report's glossary and are discussed in the text.) More specific
and quantitative design requirements must be developed as the program matures
and specific concepts are selected.
The policy philosophy of reducing risk to as low as reasonably achievable
couples the development and revision of all safety requirements to the effect on
risk. This approach allows the development of stringent requirements that are
reasonable in the context of their application. A different set of stringent
requirements will be needed for other space nuclear programs.
The recommendations for SEI nuclear propulsion flight safety requirements
are provided in the following list. These flight safety requirements are
discussed in Section 3. Guidance for ground test safety is given in Subsection
E.3 and Section 5.
E.2.1.1 Reactor Start-Up.
The reactor shall not be operated prior to space deployment,
except for low-power testing on the ground, for which negligible
radioactivity is produced.
The reactor shall be designed to remain shut down prior to the
system achieving its planned orbit.
A "planned orbit" is an Earth orbit condition, prior to insertion into an
interplanetary or Earth-Lunar trajectory, that has been predetermined to be safe
for reactor start-up operations.
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E.2.1.2 Inadvertent Criticality.
Inadvertent criticality shall be precluded for both normal and
credible accident conditions.
E.2.1.3 Radiological Release and Exposure. The following requirements
apply only to radiological releases and exposures from reactor systems operating
in space. Potential radiological releases on Earth are implicitly addressed under
reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, disposal, and entry. 29 CFR 1910.96
(U.S. OSHA, 1989), cited below, is equivalent to 10 CFR 20 (U.S. NRC, 1991a)
for radiation workers and includes a 5 rein/year whole body dose limit to
astronauts from on-board radiation sources.
I. Routine Operations and Expected Occurrences
Use 29 CFR 1910.96 dose limits for on-board radiological
sources.
• Radiological releases from the spacecraft shall not impair its use.
Radiological release from the spacecraft shall not contribute
significantly, over an extended period of time, to any local space
environment.
Radiological release from the spacecraft shall have an
insignificant effect on Earth.
H. Accidents
The probability of accidents involving radiological release
affecting the immediate or long-term health of the crew shall be
extremely low.
For those accidents involving radiological release for which the
crew is expected to survive, the radiological release shall not
render the spacecraft unusable.
The probability of a significant radiological effect from an
accident on any local space environment over an extended period
of time shall be extremely low.
The consequence on Earth of a radiological release from an
accident in space shall be insignificant.
The term "insignificant" as used here for the effect on Earth of a
radiological release in space means "much less than the value specified for
terrestrial guidelines." An "extremely low probability event" is one that is not
expected to ever occur during the execution of the SEI program. "Significant"
means "greater than the most appropriate guideline or norm." An "extended
period of time" is understood to mean "encompassing the time period of
potential future space enterprises in the region of space under consideration."
xi
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E.2.1.4 Disposal. (See entry also.)
Safe disposal of spent nuclear systems shall be explicitly
included in Space Exploration Initiative mission planning.
Adequate and reliable cooling, control, and protection for the
reactor system shall be provided for all normal and credible
accident conditions to prevent reactor system disruption or
degradation that could preclude safe disposal.
E.2.1.5 Entry. Entry refers to an event in which a reactor system enters
the atmosphere or impacts the surface of Earth or another celestial body.
• Planned Earth entry shall be precluded from mission profiles.
Both the probability and the consequences of an inadvertent entry
shall be made as low as reasonably achievable.
For inadvertent entry through an atmosphere, the reactor shall be
essentially intact, or, alternatively, shall result in essentially full
dispersal of radioactivity at high altitude.
For an impact, radioactivity shall be confined to a local area to
limit radiological consequences.
The reactor shall remain subcritical throughout an inadvertent
entry and impact.
E.2.1.6 Safeguards.
Positive measures shall be provided to control and protect the
nuclear system and its special nuclear materials (SNM) from
theft, diversion, loss, or sabotage.
To the extent practicable, the design of the nuclear system shall
incorporate features that enhance safeguards and permit proven
safeguards methods to be employed.
Positive measures or features shall be provided to facilitate timely
identification of the status as well as the location and, if
necessary, recovery of the nuclear system or its SNM.
E.2.2 Recommended Safety Guidelines
Safety guidelines are recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety,
flight trajectory and mission abort, as well as space debris and meteoroid safety
considerations. These guidelines are presented in Section 4 and are briefly
discussed below.
E.2.2.1 Risk/Reliability. The design and development activities directed
toward assuring high reliability in system features and functions should receive
xii
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major emphasis in any nuclear program. The reliability of the safety functions,
in particular, is critically important to reducing risk. Demonstration of the
achievement of the high-reliability and low-risk goals for SEI nuclear
propulsion systems must be accomplished through analysis supported by feature,
component, and subsystem testing. The analyses can be both quantitative and
qualitative as well as deterministic and statistical. An extensive set of data must
be evaluated and integrated to produce acceptable results. These efforts must
also be inherently imbedded in the design and development engineering
activities. Careful management attention to the planning and conduct of
activities contributing to the achievement of the low-risk and high-reliability
goals is required.
E.2.2.2 Operational Safety. Operational safety is focused on activities
associated with operation of the space nuclear propulsion system that are
important to safety. It includes all phases of a mission, from pre-launch
checkout through disposal of the spent nuclear system. Unique operational
aspects important to design and development of a nuclear propulsion system
have been identified and discussed in Section 4 with the objective of providing
guidance for the SEI nuclear propulsion mission planning, design, and
development efforts. Issues important to safety of both piloted and unpiloted
missions are addressed. Issues unique to piloted missions have important
implications for crew safety and can affect propulsion system requirements.
Subsection 4.2.2 describes eight candidate operational issues.
E.2.2.3 Flight Trajectory and Mission Abort. In addition to the
considerations for chemical thrust mission trajectory planning, the designers of
SEI missions using nuclear propulsion must address the nuclear safety issues
during the process of trajectory design, analysis, and selection. Specific abort
principles should be developed with systematic risk analysis and should include
provisions for addressing the recommended safety requirements.
E.2.2.4 Space Debris and Meteoroids. Meteoroids and space debris are a
part of the space environment and need to be considered in development of
safety and reliability requirements. Nuclear propulsion system designers must
also address the need to minimize the potential for adding debris to the orbital
environment surrounding Earth.
E.3 Ground Test Safety Recommendatlon_
The NSPWG also recommended the general type of safety validation testing
that could be required for nuclear propulsion systems and provided guidelines
for ground facility and equipment safety.
E.3.1 Ground Test Needs for Flight Safety Validation
Control of hazards associated with space nuclear propulsion systems will
require safety test information to validate analysis and to support demonstration
of compliance with safety requirements. Early guidance on safety validation
testing requirements is needed to permit identification of the scope of test
facility needs.
xiii
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The ground test element of the safety program should focus on data
required to assure safety objectives for flight systems will be achieved. These
data are necessary to obtain flight approval. Some of the data identified will
also be useful to other major tasks, such as ground testing of propulsion
reactors.
The flight safety tasks have been logically separated into four groupings:
launch and deployment safety, operational safety, disposal safety, and
inadvertent entry safety, Potential safety testing that should be considered
during facility planning has been delineated Subsection 5.1.2.
E.3.2 Ground Facility and Equipment Safety
The testing of space nuclear propulsion reactors will be conducted on
government sites in accordance with DOE orders. The DOE orders provide
requirements and guidance that are consistent with the recommended policy
statement. The DOE orders will require some interpretation in applying them
to specific testing. Interpretation of specific details should be done as part of
the design development and independent safety review process.
Requirements for the control of radioactive material during normal, off-
normal, and credible accident conditions have been developed for many types of
ground test reactors. These generally can be applied to the testing of nuclear
thermal propulsion (NTP) and nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) reactors.
However, the necessity to exhaust the reactor coolant in the NTP presents a
unique area of requirements that have only been considered during the Nuclear
Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application (NERVA) program and the Aircraft
Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program.
The issue of beyond-design-basis accidents also requires special attention
and may have a strong influence on the approach selected for containment or
confinement. The inherent capabilities of the nuclear thermal propulsion fuel
to retain fission products may also influence the selection of technology
development activities and safety features. Safety design activities must
evaluate the value of risk-reducing design approaches and the practicality of
implementing the approaches. Ground facility testing is discussed further in
Subsection 5.2.2.
Transportation safety and launch facility safety must also be addressed. A
certified shipping container which meets DOT and DOE/NRC regulations must
be used for the transport of fissile material (e.g., fuel, fuel rods, or a complete
reactor assembly) between the ground test facility and the launch site. Safety
procedures must be established and facility provisions must be available at the
launch site to ensure that activities associated with the nuclear system will not
pose a safety hazard. These considerations are discussed Subsections 5.2.3 and
5.2.4.
xiv
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E.4 SuEEested Future Activities
Suggested future activities for the program office to consider include the
development of a safety, quality, and reliability plan (Subsection 6.1) and the
development of a plan for public participation in the SEI nuclear propulsion
program. The importance of a plan for public communication and participation
and plan objectives are discussed in Subsection 6.2.
xv/xvi
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1. Introduction
1.1 BackEropn_
President Bush, in his speech on July 20, 1989, announced his plan to
initiate the most ambitious exploration endeavor in history. This new program,
the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), would include a return to the moon and a
manned mission to Mars by the year 2019. Nuclear propulsion has been
identified as a key enabling technology to meet the objectives of the SEI
program (Stafford, 1991).
Nuclear thermal propulsion and nuclear electric propulsion are the two
basic types of nuclear propulsion systems that could support the SEI program
within the 2019 time frame:
Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) systems produce thrust by heating a
propellant (usually hydrogen) passing through a nuclear reactor and
expanding the hot gases through a nozzle. The very high temperature
capability provided by a reactor and the use of a low molecular weight
propellant provides a high specific impulse and high levels of thrust for a
relatively low propellant and system mass. At these high thrust levels
relatively brief reactor operational times (hours) are required for a voyage
to Mars and back. A variety of solid, liquid, and gaseous core reactor
concepts have been proposed for NTP systems. NTP solid core concepts
have been proposed as the baseline technology for propulsion from Earth
orbit to Mars orbit and back (Stafford, 1991).
Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) concepts use reactor thermal power with
a power conversion system to produce electrical power. The electrical
power is then used to accelerate an ionized propellant through an electric
thruster. NEP systems produce a very high specific impulse and very low
thrust. NEP concepts require very little propellant and could entail
relatively low propulsion system mass. A variety of reactors, power
conversion devices, and electric thrusters have been proposed for NEP
systems. NEP systems have been proposed as a follow-on propulsion
technology for Mars cargo missions (Stafford, 1991) and is also under
consideration for piloted missions.
Nuclear propulsion is not a new concept. In fact, from the late 1950s
through the early 1970s, space nuclear propulsion systems were aggressively
pursued by the United States. The Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle
Application (NERVA) was developed as part of the ROVER nuclear thermal
rocket program. Twenty propulsion reactors were designed, built and tested.
Although the NERVA program established a viable capability, the program was
terminated in 1973 due to changing national priorities. Nuclear electric
propulsion systems were also designed and a variety of propulsion elements were
tested, including arc jet and ion engines. The US flight-tested the SNAP-10A
1-1
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reactor power system in 1965. Electricity produced by the reactor power system
was used to power an ion engine as part of an experimental package.
In the summer of 1990, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) held joint agency (NASA, DOE, and DOD) workshops to explore
options, issues, and requirements to initiate a new nuclear propulsion program.
A joint agency steering committee was formed during the workshops to guide
the workshop activities. The workshop participants recognized the vital
importance of safety to the successful application of nuclear propulsion for the
Space Exploration Initiative. They also recognized the necessity of establishing
nuclear safety policy during the conceptual stage to integrate safety into the
program from its inception. As a consequence, one of the recommendations
from the workshop was the formation of a joint agency working group to
develop nuclear safety policy for space nuclear propulsion in support of the SEI
program. The steering committee chartered the Nuclear Safety Policy Working
Group (NSPWG) to develop and recommend a top level nuclear safety policy
and to recommend safety requirements and guidelines for a number of specific
nuclear propulsion safety topics. The NSPWG charter is provided in Appendix
A. Five other working groups that interface with the NSPWG were also
chartered. These other working groups address missions, nuclear thermal
propulsion technology, nuclear electric propulsion technology, fuels/materials,
and facilities.
The NSPWG includes representatives from all three participating agencies.
One industry representative was also appointed as an advisor. The NSPWG
members and their affiliations are listed below:
N_;PWG Member _R.eDresentin_ From
Albert C. Marshall - Chairman
J. Charles Sawyer, Jr. - Vice Chair.
Robert A. Bari
Hatice S. Cullingford
Alva C. Hardy
James H. Lee
William H. McCulloch
George F. Niederauer
Kerry Remp
John W. Rice
Joseph A. Sholtis
Nell W. Brown - Advisor
DOE SNL
NASA HQ
DOE BNL
NASA JSC*
NASA JSC
SDIO/DOD SNL
DOE SNL
DOE LANL
NASA LeRC
DOE INEL
DOD USAF
Industry GE
* Representing the Lunar and Mars Exploration Program Office
Brief biographical sketches are provided for each member of the NSPWG in
Appendix B.
1-2
NSPWG Report
1.2 Scoue
Figure 1-1 illustrates the hierarchical structure for the development of SEI
nuclear propulsion safety policy and requirements as visualized by the NSPWG.
At the top of the hierarchy are the existing agency (DOE, NASA, POD, EPA,
etc.) policies and mandatory requirements. At the next level is a Joint Agency
Space Nuclear Propulsion Safety Policy. The safety policy establishes the
importance and priority placed on safety and provides the overall guiding
principles for the development and implementation of an effective nuclear
propulsion safety program. The Safety Functional Requirements delineate the
specific safety functions required of the system or program (e.g., preclude
inadvertent criticality). Top-level agency policies, mandatory requirements, the
joint agency Space Nuclear Propulsion Safety Policy and Safety Functional
Requirements are the responsibility of the cognizant agencies. The contractors'
responsibility begins at the level of system-specific design specifications.
Design specifications guide system design and research.
The scope of the NSPWG activities is illustrated on the left side of Figure
1-1. The NSPWG-recommended safety policy should be used to formulate the
joint agency Space Nuclear Propulsion Safety Policy for SEI. The NSPWG also
has recommended safety requirements and guidelines for important safety issues
and considerations. These recommended requirements and guidelines should be
used by SEI management and program safety management to develop the
program Safety Functional Requirements. Safety requirements and guidelines
should be useful for the purpose of conceptual design and program planning.
In comparison with the safety requirements, the safety guidelines are more in
the nature of suggestions or specific programmatic guidance; they are more
tentative than the safety requirements. These guidelines may be used to help
formulate Safety Functional Requirements as more information becomes
available.
In the course of its deliberations, the NSPWG made several assumptions
pertaining to the scope of its work. Although the working group's efforts and
the development of the policy included the consideration of non-nuclear safety
issues, the development of requirements and guidelines focused on nuclear
safety issues. Public involvement, the development of an overall safety program
plan, and recommendations for a safety review process were identified as
activities that should follow the establishment of the safety policy and are
described in Section 6 as suggested future activities. Based on the proposed SEI
mission architectures (e.g., Stafford, 1991), the NSPWG assumed that SEI would
use nuclear propulsion beginning from orbits about Earth and other celestial
bodies, on trajectories between celestial bodies and into deep space, and to and
from the surfaces of any celestial body except Earth. All mission phases were
included in the scope of the NSPWG activities. (The mission phases are divided
into the prelaunch, launch and deployment, operational, and disposal phases.)
1-$
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Figure 1-1. Development of Safety Policy and Requirements
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1.3 Annroacb
The development of the NSPWG recommendations took place during a
series of ten meetings between November 1990 and September 1991. Three
meetings were held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, two in Washington, D.C., one
in Houston, Texas; the remaining meetings were conducted by teleconference.
To allow for input from the community, NSPWG meeting minutes were mailed
to a wide distribution. Participation by observers and guest speakers at
meetings was permitted by special request. In addition, two open sessions were
held in Washington, D.C. for all interested parties. Presentations of the NSPWG
interim findings were also given at a Steering Committee meeting in Cleveland,
Ohio in April 1991, at the 1991 annual meeting of the American Nuclear
Society in Orlando, Florida in June 1991, and at an American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics conference in Cleveland, Ohio, in September 1991
(Marshall and Sawyer, 1991).
The schedule of NSPWG activities is provided by Figure 1-2. The NSPWG
first established its scope, objectives, approach, and schedule and defined its
terminology. Existing national and international safety requirements were
reviewed (e.g., U.S. DOE, 1984). In addition, pertinent previously developed
safety policies were also reviewed (e.g., Wahlquist, 1990). A top-level safety
policy was formulated and distributed to the individuals on the minutes
distribution list for comments. Comments received were then used to make
appropriate modifications to provide the recommended safety policy presented
in this document.
Members were assigned principal responsibility for one or more of the
safety issues identified in the charter or other safety issues identified by the
NSPWG. The responsible NSPWG member for each safety topic presented a
discussion of the topic to the group using a standard format. The format
included the following subjects:
Scope
Issues
Discussion
- information available
- considerations, impact and implications
- justification of requirements and guidelines
- additional work needed, and safety testing
- NTP versus NEP considerations
- manned versus unmanned considerations
- reusability considerations.
Discussions on each topic continued until consensus was reached on draft
recommendations.
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Figure 1-2. NSPWG Activity Schedule
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1.4 Reoort Orzanlzation
remainder of this report is organized as follows:
The recommended safety policy for the SEI nuclear propulsion program is
presented in Section 2. Subsection 2.1 provides the text of the
recommended safety policy. The policy is intended to be a clear and
concise statement to enhance the visibility, importance, and comprehension
of the guiding safety philosophy. An elaboration, interpretation, and
discussion of the safety policy is provided in Subsection 2.2.
Recommended flight safety requirements are presented in Section 3.
Subsection 3.1 provides guidance for the use of the requirements. Concise
statements of the recommended requirements and a discussion of the
requirements are given in Subsection 3.2.
Section 4 presents recommended safety guidelines for flight systems.
Recommended guidelines for ground testing are provided in Section 5.
Candidate safety validation tests are briefly discussed in Subsection 5.1 for
the purpose of facility planning. Safety considerations for ground test
facilities, ground transportation of nuclear systems, and nuclear safety at
the launch site are discussed in Subsection 5.2.
A preliminary discussion of suggested future safety activities is presented
in Section 6.
Appendixes A and B provide the NSPWG charter and the background of
the working group members.
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2. Recommended Safety Policy
2.1 Statement
The following is the NSPWG-recommended policy statement.
Recommended Space Exploration Initiative
Nuclear Propulsion Safety Policy
Ensuring safety is a paramount objective of the Space Exploration
Initiative nuclear propulsion program; all program activities shall be
conducted in a manner to achieve this objective. The fundamental
program safety philosophy shall be to reduce risk to levels as low as
reasonably achievable. In conjunction with this philosophy, stringent
design and operational safety requirements shall be established and
met for all program activities to ensure the protection of individuals
and the environment. These requirements shall be based on applicable
regulations, standards, and research.
A comprehensive safety program shall be established. It shall
include continual monitoring and evaluation of safety performance and
shall provide for independent safety oversight. Clear lines of
authority, responsibility, and communication shall be established and
maintained. Furthermore, program management shall foster a safety
consciousness among all program participants and throughout all
aspects of the nuclear propulsion program.
2.2 DBeus$ign
The following expansion of the safety policy statement discusses the
implications of each of the principles embodied in the safety policy.
The Space Exploration Initiative nuclear propulsion program will develop
propulsion systems to support human and robotic exploration of the solar
system. Ensuring safety during the execution of the nuclear propulsion program
is a paramount objective; all program activities shall be conducted in a manner
to achieve this objective. This policy reflects the commitment at the highest
levels of program management to safety.
Safety is defined here as a condition judged to be of sufficiently low risk.
In the context of this policy, safety is meant to include the health and safety of
the public, program personnel, and mission crew as well as the protection of
terrestrial and non-terrestrial environments. Safety also includes safeguarding
nuclear systems and special nuclear materials against unauthorized use or
diversion and protecting facilities and equipment from damage or loss. Safety
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must be a primary consideration in all phases of the nuclear propulsion
program, including design, development, fabrication, transportation, ground
testing, system integration and prelaunch activities, launch, deployment, flight
testing, operation, and disposal. Safety should be integrated into the design
from conception and must be a key consideration in all design, operational, and
programmatic decisions.
To ensure the protection of individuals and the environment, the
fundamental program safety philosophy shall be to reduce risk to as low as
reasonably achievable. Economic and social factors and technology maturity
must be taken into account to guide the judgment of what is reasonably
achievable. This philosophy couples the development and revision of all safety
requirements to their effect on risk. Risk is a measure of potential harm or
damage, incorporating both the probabilities of undesirable consequences and
the magnitude of the consequences, such as number of exposed individuals,
number of injuries and fatalities, and the level of environmental contamination.
Reduction of risk implies a reduction in both the probability and consequences
of potential adverse events.
The development of stringent design and operational safety requirements is
essential to implement the fundamental safety philosophy of reducing risk to as
low as reasonably achievable. Safety requirements must also accommodate
aversion to severe accidents of extremely low probability. These safety
requirements must be established and met for all program activities and must be
based on applicable regulations and standards and incorporate relevant
developments from research activities. These requirements ensure compliance
with all applicable national and international regulations.
For any space mission involving significant quantities of radioactive or
fissile material, launch approval must be given by the Executive Office of the
President of the United States, based on comparison of the projected benefits
and the risks for the mission. The decision is based on an established and
proven review process that includes an independent assessment of mission safety
by an Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP). The commitment of
the nuclear propulsion program to keep risks as low as reasonably achievable
helps ensure a judgment that the benefits of potential missions will outweigh
the risk.
A comprehensive safety program shall be established to cover all program
phases. It shall be directed toward making a thorough search for hazards,
establishing requirements for eliminating and controlling hazards, executing
experimental and analytical evaluations of the associated risks, and providing
reasonable assurance that all safety issues have been identified and adequately
treated. The program shall include continual monitoring and evaluation of all
activities important to safety and shall, in addition to the final INSRP
assessment and review described above, provide for periodic, competent, and
independent safety oversight. The safety program should include a clear
delineation of the safety assurance function and should be coordinated with the
quality assurance and reliability functions.
Effective safety administration is an essential element of the nuclear
propulsion safety program and must be guided at the policy level to ensure
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adequate safety implementation. Clear lines of authority and communication
for safety shall be established and maintained. Lines of authority for safety
must be instituted to ensure safety responsibility and accountability. Effective
communication is essential to implement the safety program. As part of the
communication process, it is important to foster open communication with
program participants and the public regarding both the benefits and risks
associated with the SEI nuclear propulsion program. The specific emphasis
placed by the program on safety and the progress toward the safety objectives
should also be communicated. The predicted system responses and the expected
and potential environments for systems interfacing with the nuclear propulsion
system must be communicated among all system developers to ensure
appropriate mission level safety evaluations. The specific definition of an
organizational structure for safety and the assignment of responsibilities within
that structure is vital to the realization of the goals and objectives of the safety
program, but that function is outside the scope of this policy statement and
discussion and is left to the overall management of SEI using the policy as
guidance.
Safety is essential to the success of the program. Management should take
specific actions to develop and maintain a safety consciousness among all
program participants and throughout all aspects of the SEI nuclear propulsion
program. This requires that management be committed to the health and safety
of its workers and the public and the protection of the environment, that this
commitment be communicated to all program participants, and that safety be
given explicit consideration in all technical, operational, and programmatic
decisions. The goal is for the commitment to safety to so pervade the program
that all participants recognize their safety responsibilities and automatically
consider the safety implications of their work.
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3. Recommended Safety Requirements for Flight Systems
3,1 Intended Use of Recommended Reaulrements
The requirements presented in this section and the guidelines given in
Section 4 are recommended for use by SEI program safety management to
develop program Safety Functional Requirements. A different set of Safety
Functional Requirements will be needed for other space nuclear programs and
applications. The recommended safety requirements, and the recommended
guidelines provided in Section 4, should also be useful for the purpose of
conceptual design and program planning.
As the nuclear propulsion program progresses and systems designs mature,
the Safety Functional Requirements may need to be modified to maintain the
intent of the Safety Policy. Nuclear systems designers and developers should be
allowed to propose modifications to the requirements to make them more
applicable to the developing systems. The justification for such changes should
include the demonstration that the replacement maintains or improves the level
of compliance with the program Safety Policy. Any modifications to Safety
Functional Requirements will require formal approval by program safety and
cognizant agencies through an established review and approval process.
Approval of revised safety requirements must be based on an assessment that
revisions are consistent with the philosophy of reducing risk to as low as
reasonably achievable. This process of proposing revised or supplementary
safety requirements allows the requirements to be adapted to the developing
program. This process can also stimulate innovation and the creation of systems
designs that will lead to improved safety and system performance. When
establishing or modifying Safety Functional Requirements, preference should be
given to inherent or passive safety measures over the incorporation of active
safety features. Revisions to design specifications affecting safety should be
based on this philosophy as well.
3.2 Recommended Reouirements
Recommended safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up,
inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and
safeguards. Both quantitative and qualitative requirements have been
recommended. Quantitative requirements for radiological exposures were
recommended only when applicable established guidance could be cited. More
specific and quantitative design requirements must be developed as the program
matures and specific concepts and missions are defined. The development of all
recommended requirements (and any subsequent modifications) must be
compatible with the fundamental philosophy of reducing risk to as low as
reasonably achievable.
The recommended requirements are presented and discussed below.
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3.2.1 Reactor Start-Up
Safety issues concerning reactor start-up and operation during the
prelaunch, launch, and deployment phases are included under the heading of
reactor start-up.
A reactor fueled by uranium 235 that has never been operated has a very
small radioactive inventory. This inventory is limited to the natural
radioactivity of the fuel. Very low-power operation, which may be employed
for ground testing, produces a negligible increase in the radioactivity of the
reactor system. During power operation, significant neutron and gamma
radiation emanates from the reactor. If the reactor operates at an appreciable
power level for a sufficient length of time, the reactor will accumulate a
significant radioactive inventory that can remain after reactor shutdown. Thus,
radiation from an operating reactor or a reactor that has been operated at an
appreciable power level could cause a significant exposure to ground operations
crews and to launch crews. For a pre-launch, launch, or deployment accident
with an operating reactor or a reactor that has been operated at significant
power levels, additional issues are raised concerning the potential for radiation
exposure to the public and the release of radioactive materials into the
environment.
The current NASA mission planning documents for SEI (e.g., Stafford
1991) do not include suborbital reactor operations in their mission planning
options; consequently, scenarios requiring suborbital start-up were considered to
be beyond the NSPWG scope. Considering this scope, a simple and prudent
approach to address the issues under discussion would be to require that the
reactor not be operated and remain shutdown until an acceptable orbit is
achieved. Very low-power testing of the reactor on the ground should be
excluded from this requirement, provided that the fission and activation product
inventory from testing is negligible at the time of launch. Reactor shutdown, as
used in this discussion, is defined as being subcritical by an adequate margin
and incorporating positive measures to ensure that the reactor remains securely
subcritical. The recommended requirement for reactor start-up is as follows:
The reactor shall not be operated prior to space deployment,
except for low-power testing on the ground, for which negligible
radioactivity is produced.
The reactor shall be designed to remain shut down prior to the
system achieving its planned orbit.
A "planned orbit" is an Earth orbit condition, prior to insertion into an
interplanetary or Earth-Lunar trajectory, that has been predetermined to be safe
for reactor start-up operations.
3.2.2 Inadvertent Criticality
When shut down, a reactor is subcritical; that is, it cannot support a
neutron chain reaction. In this state the reactor is producing no fission power
and no additional radioactive inventory. A reactor accident could cause the
reactor to become critical by causing changes in the configuration of reactor
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materials or by changing the material environment of the reactor. Fuel
compaction and water immersion from a launch or inadvertent entry accident
are examples of these potential accident-caused changes. An inadvertent
criticality event can produce significant radiation and can increase the
radioactive inventory of the reactor. When additional accident conditions are
postulated, criticality could pose a potential hazard to the crew, the public, and
the environment. If sufficient power is produced during an inadvertent
criticality event, disruption of the reactor system could occur, with the potential
for release of radioactive materials to the environment. The potential for
inadvertent criticality can be essentially precluded by incorporating features to
assure a secure shutdown during launch (see Subsection 3.2.1) and assuring
highly reliable shutdown features for accidents. The recommended requirement
for inadvertent criticality is as follows:
Inadvertent criticality shall be precluded for both normal and
credible accident conditions.
3.2.3 Radiological Release and Exposure
Guidance on radiological releases and exposures to radiation from reactor
propulsion systems deployed in space are needed to protect the mission crew,
space environment, and Earth environment. The protection of other space
enterprises, such as other space missions involving astronauts, is encompassed by
protection of space environments, in addition, the mission spacecraft must be
protected from any adverse effects that could result from radiological releases.
This guidance pertains to routine operation and potential accidents in space.
Space, in this context, includes all regions beyond Earth's biosphere, including
other celestial bodies. Radiological release and exposure prior to intended
operation or in the event of inadvertent Earth entry are covered in Subsections
3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.5. Principal reactor sources of radiation include neutrons
and gamma radiation that have not been stopped by radiation shielding,
potential fission product release, and positron and electrons produced from
gamma interactions with the system. Charged fission products, positrons, and
electrons can be trapped in Earth's magnetosphere and remain a source of
radiation for a period of time. Trapped radiation can contribute to the crew
dose and can adversely affect other space enterprises, such as satellite gamma
ray observations.
For routine operation and expected occurrences, allowable doses can be
preestablished. For accidents, deterministic requirements are inappropriate and
probabilistic guidance is recommended. In all cases the principle of reducing
radiological risk to as low as reasonably achievable should be used to enhance
safety. Current NASA guidance for total whole body dose is 50 rem/year, of
which 5 rem/year may be received from man-made on-board radiation sources
(see 29 CFR 1910.96 [U.S. OSHA, 1989]). Since the natural background
radiation dose to the crew will be quite high for some proposed SEI missions,
the 5 rem/year dose limit from reactor radiation is both reasonable and prudent.
Pursuant to 29 CFR 1960.18 (U.S. OSHA, 1991), NASA has adopted the
recommendations of the National Commission on Radiological Protection and
Measurements (NCRP, 1989) as its supplementary standard for space flight crew
radiation exposures. NASA implementation of this standard requires, among
other things, that exposure limits for on-board radiation sources comply with 29
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CFR 1910.96, except where the NASA mission or objectives cannot be
accomplished otherwise.
Radiological release to the space environment may have a significant or
insignificant effect depending on where and when it is released and depending
on the quantity and type of radiation released. For example, an appreciable
release of long-lived radioactive materials on the surface of the moon would be
unacceptable and in violation of international treaties. On the other hand, it
could be acceptable to allow released radioactive materials in some regions of
deep space to decay and dissipate over a period of years. Conditions for
releases in space and potential future space enterprises are too numerous to
allow quantitative guidance at this stage.
No established guidance was found that would be directly applicable for
setting quantitative limits for radiological contamination of Earth's environment
from space activities. A conservative requirement for releases in space
potentially affecting Earth's environment would be to assure that any
radiological contribution to Earth's environment is much less than the
radiological guidelines for terrestrial activities. For example, the US
Environmental Protection Agency limitations for radiological environmental
contamination of US territory could be the most appropriate guideline.
The recommendations presented here recognize that any radioactive
releases in space, for both normal and accident conditions, should have an
insignificant and probably undetectable effect on Earth's environment. Based
on these considerations the requirements for radiological release and exposure
are as follows:
L Routine Operations and Expected Occurrences
Use 29 CFR 1910.96 dose limits for on board radiological
sources.
• Radiological releases from the spacecraft shall not impair its use.
Radiological release from the spacecraft shall not contribute
significantly, over an extended period of time, to any local space
environment.
Radiological release from the spacecraft shall have an
insignificant effect on Earth.
II. Accidents
The probability of accidents involving radiological release
affecting the immediate or long-term health of the crew shall be
extremely low.
For those accidents involving radiological release for which the
crew is expected to survive, the radiological release shall not
render the spacecraft unusable.
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The probability of a significant radiological effect from an
accident on any local space environment over an extended period
of time shall be extremely low. This environment includes other
space enterprises.
The consequence on Earth of a radiological release from an
accident in space shall be insignificant.
The term "insignificant" as used here for the effect on Earth of a
radiological release in space means "much less than the value specified for
terrestrial guidelines." An "extremely low probability event" is one that is not
expected to ever occur during the execution of the SEI program. "Significant"
means "greater than the most appropriate guideline or norm." An "extended
period of time" is understood to mean "encompassing the time period of
potential future space enterprises in the region of space under consideration."
The requirement presented above for radiological effects from accidents on
the spacecraft apply only to radiological effects. Reactor failures or accidents
might render the spacecraft unusable from factors other than radiological
effects. These other factors must be addressed as reliability considerations, and
their management must be consistent with the philosophy of reducing risk to as
low as reasonably achievable.
3.2.4 Disposal
Disposal plans for space reactor systems and associated spacecraft
components should be established well before the propulsion system is deployed.
Furthermore, the method of disposal must be safe; that is, the radioactive
materials of the disposed reactor system must not endanger the public or the
environment. Strategies for disposal must preclude entry by orbital decay, in
order to comply with the requirement for no planned Earth entry (see
Subsection 3.2.5). The reactor system integrity must be protected for all normal
conditions and credible accident conditions, including collisons with meteroids
and orbital debris, that could Compromise the user's ability to dispose of the
reactor system safely. The potential for contamination of the space environment
should also be assessed. For example, destructive collisions with space debris or
meteoroids could contaminate large regions of space.
After considering a number of disposal options, the NSPWG concluded that
approaches using disposal out of Earth orbit are preferred. Other disposal
options should be evaluated and compared to determine the approach in which
risk is reduced to as low as reasonably achievable. Based on these
considerations, the requirements for disposal are as follows:
Safe disposal of spent reactor systems shall be explicitly included
in Space Exploration Initiative mission planning.
Adequate and reliable cooling, control, and protection for the
reactor system shall be provided for all normal and credible
accident conditions to prevent reactor system disruption and
degradation that could preclude safe disposal.
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3.2.5 Entry ...........
Entry refers to an event in which a reactor system enters the atmosphere
or impacts the surface of Earth or another celestial body. Entry issues include
the potential for the release of fission products and activation products into
Earth's or another planet's environment and the potential for exposure from
direct radiation from the reactor. Radioactive release due to entry can result
from the effects of passing through a planetary atmosphere or from reactor
disruption from impact.
Precluding planned Earth entry is recommended as a prudent means to
reduce risk to as low as reasonably achievable. Landing nuclear propulsion
systems on celestial bodies other than Earth is permitted, provided that the
requirements for radiological release and exposure are met. Furthermore,
planned Earth entry refers to mission planning and does not include planning
following unforeseen events. For example, a mission terminated prior to the
reactor generating a significant radioactive inventory is an unforeseen event.
The return of the reactor system to Earth for this situation would not be
precluded if it can be shown that the operation can be carried out safely.
The reactor system could enter inadvertently because of a misdirected
thrust, fragmentation in orbit and subsequent decay, or from other causes.
Inadvertent entry could occur during the launch, operation, or disposal phases.
Once deployed, the potential for inadvertent entry can be largely prevented by
proper choice of orbits and trajectories and careful maneuvering of the
spacecraft when making trajectory adjustments. Should inadvertent entry occur,
significant radioactive contamination or exposure can be prevented by ensuring
that the reactor remains intact following entry and impact. Alternatively, risk
can be reduced by ensuring essentially full high-altitude dispersal of
radioactivity. A reactor is essentially intact if it retains sufficient integrity to
maintain subcriticality and to keep radioactive fuel, solid fission products, and
structures together collectively. (Inadvertent criticality from an inadvertent
entry is covered in Subsection 3.2.2 as an accident condition). "Essentially full
dispersal" means that radioactive material is widely dispersed in the atmosphere
as an aerosol such that the consequences on Earth's environment are
insignificant (much less than for terrestrial guidelines). The consequences of
other entry modes (e.g., partial disruption) are expected to be greater than for
either intact entry or full dispersal.
Should inadvertent entry and impact occur, emergency response measures
will be more effective for small areas of distribution of system debris. The
location and cleanup of system debris is simpler for debris confined to small
areas than for widely scattered debris. Recommended requirements for entry
are as follows:
• Planned Earth entry shall be precluded from mission profiles.
Both the probability and consequences of an inadvertent entry
shall be made as low as reasonably achievable.
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For an inadvertent entry through an atmosphere, the reactor shall
be essentially intact, or, alternatively, shall result in essentially
full dispersal of radioactivity at high altitude.
For an impact, radioactivity shall be confined to a local area to
limit radiological consequences.
The reactor shall remain subcritical throughout an inadvertent
entry and impact.
3.2.6 Safeguards
The safeguards topic encompasses all measures provided to control and
protect the nuclear system and special nuclear materials (SNMs). The theft,
diversion, loss, or sabotage of special nuclear materials must be prevented
during all phases of the program. If special nuclear materials fall into
unauthorized hands, national or subnational entities may utilize the materials for
a nuclear weapon. The likelihood of successful unauthorized use can be
reduced by early detection and maximizing the available response time. Prior to
launch, successful theft, diversion, or sabotage can be made extremely unlikely
through the application of standard, proven physical security and safeguard
methods and procedures. Subsequent to launch, potential unauthorized use is
generally limited to selected abort or accident situations where opportunity and
accessibility exist.
Proven safeguards approaches developed for terrestrial use are applicable to
the protection of nuclear propulsion system hardware and SNM prior to launch.
It is important to ensure, to the extent practicable, that this existing safeguards
technology is not precluded or compromised by the nuclear propulsion system
design. Also, design options exist which can enhance safeguards of nuclear
propulsion system hardware. This is particularly true with respect to the
nuclear fuel, especially its composition and material form. In assessing such
options, consideration should be given to preserving the direct applicability of
existing safeguards technology. Based on these considerations, the
recommended safeguards requirements are:
Positive measures shall be provided to control and protect the
nuclear system and its special nuclear materials (SNM) from
theft, diversion, loss, or sabotage.
To the extent practicable, the design of the nuclear system shall
incorporate features that enhance safeguards and permit proven
safeguards methods to be employed.
Positive measures or features shall be provided to facilitate timely
identification of the status as well as the location and, if
necessary, recovery of the nuclear system or its SNM.
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4. Recommended Guidelines for Flight Systems
4,1 Intended Use of Guidelines
Safety guidelines are recommended for use by the program to establish
program plans as well as design and operational requirements for the
development of nuclear propulsion systems for SEI. Some of these guidelines
may be useful for formulating additional Safety Functional Requirements.
Safety guidelines are recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight
trajectory and mission abort, as well as space debris and meteoroid safety
considerations.
4.2 R¢¢qmmended Guidelines
4.2.1 Risk/Reliability
Considerations, discussion, and recommendations related to risk and
reliability evaluations have been combined because of their common need to
evaluate failure mechanisms and the probability of their occurrence. The design
and development activities directed toward assuring high reliability in system
features and functions should receive major emphasis in any nuclear program.
The reliability of the safety functions, in particular, are critically important to
reducing risks both during ground testing and for the flight mission.
4.2.1.1 Reliability Program. All activities in the SEI program, including
the nuclear propulsion activities should be guided by a formal reliability
program based on a common technical approach. The reliability program should
focus on the generic problem of demonstrating high reliability at the system
level based on feature and component testing and a few subsystem=level tests.
The reliability program should be integral with the engineering design and
development activities to maximize the usefulness of test data. This means that
reliability technologists should support definition of the design and development
testing, and these efforts should include margin testing and test-to-failure
activities necessary to support demonstration of reliability.
The reliability program should include analytical activities to relate
empirical data to systems-level performance objectives and support definition of
data requirements. These analytical activities should also be used to support the
establishment of priorities for the data requirements. Highest priority should be
given to the design and data requirements that support evaluation and
demonstration of the reliability of safety functions. For example, demonstration
of the reliability of the control system to perform the shutdown function is very
important to safety. Shutdown heat removal and its role in retaining radioactive
materials is also an important safety function, especially in ground testing.
The reliability program should focus on identifying and eliminating, if
possible, mechanisms that can cause failure. Standard methods, such as Failure
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Modes and Effects Analysis (FIVIEA), should be applied to search systematically
for failure mechanisms. Identified failure mechanisms that cannot be
eliminated should have demonstrated margins relative to the required
performance lifetime.
Large subsystem tests and flight system tests should include activities that
provide assurance that tests can be conducted with a high probability of being
completed as planned. These activities should be integrated with the quality
assurance activities and could include elements such as a critical items list. The
reliability program should also include activities to support establishing design
and procurement specifications of those parts required to achieve the reliability
objectives.
4.2.1.2 Risk Analysis. All program elements should support the safety
policy objective of assuring that risks are as low as reasonably achievable.
Design-basis mission risk analysis should be initiated as soon as possible to serve
as the foundation of the future baseline mission risk analyses. The risk analysis
tasks should provide analytical evaluation of the risk to individuals and the
environment associated with each major task. This information should be
compiled and reported to the responsible line management for use in the
decision making process. The risk analysis information should also be used to
guide safety design requirements and safety testing and analysis development
activities. Figure 4-1 illustrates the proposed role of risk and safety analysis in
SEI. Several types of risk assessments and analysis will be required to
incorporate the nuclear and space technology elements into a common set of
methods.
For large, expensive nuclear systems, it is not practical to obtain large
samples of system-level failure rates. Nor is it practical to run large-scale tests
for severe accident consequences included in risk assessments. These issues can
only be addressed through detailed probabilistic analysis using subsystem and
piece-part failure-rate data and phenomenological test data on failure
mechanisms and accident consequences. Much has been accomplished in the
fifteen years since WASH-1400 (Rasmussen, 1975) was published to advance the
methods for reliability prediction and risk assessment. The methods, when
appropriately applied, focus on assuring that high-quality judgments are derived
from test data and validated analyses. These methods have been used in a
preliminary fashion to perform a Mission Risk Analysis (MRA) for SP-100.
The safety analysis reports (SARs) and safety evaluation reports (SERs) for past
RTG-powered space missions also involve extensive use of probabilistic risk
assessment methods.
The reliability analysis activities should be coordinated with the risk
analysis activities to avoid duplication of effort and potential inconsistency in
approach or evaluations. For example, activities such as fault tree analysis
required to perform safety/risk assessments should use the same data base as the
reliability program activities.
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Proposed Role of Risk and Safety Analysis in SEI
m
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Figure 4-1. Proposed Role of Risk and Safety Analysis in SEI (Simplified)
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Risk analyses will require the results of consequence analyses and the
testing used to validate consequence models. Consequence analyses and testing
provide prediction of potential accident sequences and the uncertainties
associated with these predictions. Consequence analysis and testing must be
integrated with the risk analyses methods. For example, uncertainties in
trajectory analysis for abort sequences should be systematically investigated and
factored into the mission risk analysis. Several acceptable ways to structure
these types of activities are possible, and it is important to tailor these efforts to
the specific organization structures and types of technology. Since this
information is not yet available, very specific recommendations concerning these
activities cannot be provided at this stage. Risk analysis activities must be
integrated sufficiently well to make it possible for the line management and
safety technologists to demonstrate jointly the safety adequacy of flight designs
and test facility operations.
Figure 4-2 illustrates the activities and interfaces that should be maintained
between the reliability and risk analysis activities (top and bottom paths on the
figure, respectively). Feedback activities have been omitted to simplify the
diagram, but several iterations of the identified activities can be anticipated.
Starting at the left of the figure, conceptual designs will be used to plan
development activities. Both analytical methods and testing related to failure
probability and failure consequences will be required to support the risk
analysis. Data bases currently available, as well as those unique to SEI, should
be compiled and controlled for common use in the program analysis. Two
activity boxes identify the expert judgement processes that need to be
developed and commonly applied to both probability and consequence results
used in risk analysis. Probabilistic, consequence, and mission event trees all
feed into the risk analysis, the output of which is used to develop safety
requirements and support safety analysis reports. The reliability analysis
activity and the consequence analysis also directly support the development of
safety requirements used for system and mission design.
4.2.2 Operational Safety
All missions planned in SEI, whether piloted, cargo, or robotic, require
long operational sequences that include a large number of varied operations.
Consideration of these operations and the design strategy to assure that they can
all be accomplished safely should be completed as early as practical. Early
objectives include: (1) incorporation of adequate safety margins and operational
safety features in the design, (2) identification of all developmental equipment
required to support safe operations, and (3) identification of the design duty
cycles and environmental conditions that this equipment must accommodate to
assure its reliability for all mission phases. Normal, abort, and credible accident
sequences must be included. A high level of computer simulation is
recommended. Candidate human-machine interface equipment should be
integrated with nuclear system simulators. It is important that these tasks be
given priority and visibility so requirements that will lead to acceptable levels
of mission safety can be established.
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Eight issues have been identified in this discussion as potential topics to be
addressed by the operational safety activity. Other high-priority issues may be
identified that should also be integrated into this effort. Although this effort
and the topics addressed also apply to considerations other than safety, the
recommendations and discussion provided here place emphasis on operational
safety.
4.2.2.1 Integrating Safety Considerations. The first level of safety is
provided by sound design and operational practice. This means that it is
desirable to have large margins between the operating envelope and the
operational states that approach failure. The designer and developer should be
aware of the need to identify the margins in the design. When beneficial and
practical, the margins should be increased relative to safety limits.
4.2.2.2 Criticality and Control Calibration. As part of the acceptance
testing, it will probably be necessary to achieve reactor criticality and calibrate
the control devices and instrumentation. This operation may take place at the
factory or launch site. The approach to this operation should be considered
during the conceptual and preliminary design phases. The pre-operational
safety aspects associated with maintaining safe nuclear critical experiments are a
part of this activity. Control system design or supplementary features required
to assure a very low probability for inadvertent criticality during these
operations should be considered.
4.2.2.3 Role of Flight Crew in Nuclear Operation. It is almost certain
that even during piloted missions the reactor(s) will automatically start up and
restart and will be automatically controlled. However, it is equally certain that
on piloted missions the crew will have opportunities to intervene in these
automatic actions, if in their judgement this is warranted. The information
required to support their making sound decisions will influence instrumentation
requirements. Response actions could also have special requirements that merit
early consideration so that the system is designed to perform properly in an
emergency. Pilot roles and procedures should be identified so that
instrumentation and information for pilot emergency actions or intervention, if
any, are identified and developed.
4.2.2,4 Instrumentation Requirements and Operational Strategies.
Autonomous control will be required for cargo and robotic missions and will
probably be used for piloted missions. Diagnostic and fault correction systems
will be necessary to achieve the high systems reliability requirements. These
strategies must include features to reduce inadvertent or spurious shutdowns.
Spurious shutdowns could adversely affect crew safety. These strategies and the
equipment to implement them have safety implications that require evaluation as
soon as practical in the design cycle. Sensor information reliability and
confirmation of the reliability of diagnostic and fault correction strategies will
require thorough consideration.
4.2.2.5 Development of the Operational Duty Cycle. The nuclear
propulsion system operational duty cycle must be identified to assure adequate
margins in the design. Thermal and mechanical cycling can be very important
to failure analysis. Early identification of the duty cycles and their relationship
to planned mission and abort strategies are needed to allow safety evaluations to
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influence the establishment of adequate margins in the design duty cycle. This
effort would also contribute to identification of features needed for shutdown
heat removal.
4.2.2.6 Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA). The system developer and
mission designer should avoid EVA (planned or contingency) during all mission
phases because of the significant hazard and complication associated with an
EVA. If in-flight EVA is absolutely required, reactor shielding and EVA
protected zone (shielded) constraints and requirements must be established. For
nuclear propulsion systems that release toxic or radioactive material during
operation, the system developer and mission designer must consider provisions
for on-board procedures and facilities for post-EVA radiation detection,
containment, and, if necessary, decontamination. Specific guidelines,
procedures, constraints, and requirements addressing these and other possible
EVA nuclear propulsion issues should be established by the system developer
and mission designer.
4.2.2.7 Proximity Operations. Proximity operations during SEI missions
include orbit and interplanetary flight activities involving vehicle rendezvous,
docking, and station keeping. After reactor start-up, exposure to reactor
radiation will be a major concern for these activities. The nuclear propulsion
system developer and the SEI mission designer must consider reactor shielding,
protected zone (shielded) and distance constraints and requirements for all
proximity operations planning. Guidelines, constraints, and requirements should
be established to address these issues.
4.2.2.8 Testing and Surveillance. It will be necessary to conduct both
testing and surveillance of various nuclear propulsion subsystems and their
interfaces with other subsystems at times during flight. The need to conduct
such tests is related to the mission profile and the variation in the operational
state of subsystems. For example, each period of reactor operation and
thrusting could be followed by a long period of shutdown and coasting. Prior
to powered restart it will be necessary to identify the instrumentation and
control actuators that are still operational and, if some have failed, to identify
the level of redundancy and associated operational strategy. To assure that the
testing and surveillance activities can be completed, it is first necessary to
identify them and the procedures for testing and verifying their operation.
4.2.3 Flight Trajectory and Mission Abort
In addition to the many and varied inputs, constraints, and requirements
necessary for chemical thrust mission trajectory planning, the designers of SEI
missions using nuclear propulsion must address the nuclear safety issues during
the process of trajectory design, analysis, and selection. Specific nuclear safety
issues that should be addressed are discussed elsewhere in this report. The
sections that discuss these nuclear safety issues are referenced below:.
• Reactor Start-Up Requirements--Subsection 3.2.1
• Inadvertent Criticality--Subsection 3.2.2
• Radiological Release and Exposure Requirements--Subsection 3.2.3
• Disposal Requirements--Subsection 3.2.4
• Entry Requirements--Subsection 3.2.5
• Risk/Reliability Guidelines--Subsection 4.2.1
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• Operational Safety GuidelinesmSubsection 4.2.2.
Specific mission-abort principles should be developed with systematic risk
analysis, and where practical, should include provisions for addressing the
nuclear safety requirements listed above. In the event of mission abort after
nuclear system operation, flight elements should have sufficient alternate
(nuclear or non-nuclear) propulsion capability to return the crew safely and
place the nuclear reactor in the planned or alternate disposal trajectory.
4.2.4 Space Debris and Meteoroids
Meteoroids and space debris are a part of the space environment and need
to be considered in the development of safety and reliability requirements. The
technology required to quantify this environment and provide protection for
spacecraft is ongoing. Unique features associated with nuclear propulsion
systems requiring special development attention have not been identified. The
ongoing development efforts for sensors and protective materials to address
debris and meteroids concerns may need to be supplemented to support the SEI
programs. Improved measurement and modeling of the environment could be
of benefit to the spacecraft and propulsion system designers. Because of their
large radiator areas, NEP systems are likely to require more attention to
protection from space debris and meteoroids than NTP systems would. The
need to accommodate particle impacts may be the limiting factor for minimizing
the mass of large NEP radiators. For NTP systems, pressure requirements and
structural requirements result in relatively thick fuel tanks and other large
surfaces of potential concern. These thicker components for NTP systems
reduce their potential vulnerability to particle impacts.
Mission trajectories for most candidate SEI missions require relatively short
time periods in the space debris environment; consequently, the probability of
debris impacts is relatively low and substantial protective features might not be
required. NEP-powered missions will have longer periods of exposure to space
debris but exposures will be still relatively short compared to spacecraft that
continually orbit Earth.
A second issue related to space debris is the potential that SEI spacecraft
and power systems have for adding debris to the environment. Of greatest
concern is addition of debris to the orbital environment surrounding Earth, but
more generally to include the orbits of other planetary environments visited by
the spacecraft. The National Space Policy requires,
" . . . All space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space
debris. Design and operations of space tests, experiments and systems
will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris
consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness. The U.S.
Government will encourage other space-faring nations to adopt
policies and practices aimed at debris minimization..."
The nuclear propulsion system designers need to be made aware of these
requirements and take measures to control release of debris material. These
requirements may have greater implications for any NTP systems that release
some particulate in the coolant flow. Even though these particles may be
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extremely small, the potentially large numbers of them will influence
requirements for limiting erosion of the fuel surface.
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5. Recommended Guidelines for Ground Activities
Safety requirements for ground testing nuclear propulsion reactors are
needed to establish facility designs. Requirements are needed in two broad
categories: (1) requirements for testing that will assure flight systems achieve
the program safety objectives and support launch approval, and (2) requirements
to assure that ground testing will be conducted safely. Subsection 5.1 addresses
the first category and Subsection 5.2 addresses the second category. Much of
the work identified in Subsection 5.1 supports ground test safety objectives as
well as flight test safety objectives.
_,1 Ground Test Needs for Safety ValidatiQn
5.1.1 Background
Control of hazards associated with space nuclear propulsion systems will
require safety test information to validate analysis and to support both
establishing and demonstrating compliance with safety requirements. Early
guidance is needed to identify the scope of testing needed to support flight
system safety and test facility safety requirements. Care should be taken not to
confuse safety requirements for ground testing with those for the flight system.
Nuclear propulsion systems technology varies over a broad range and the
design options for many candidate concepts are also quite varied. Options based
on advanced NERVA technology solid fuel designs are reasonably definitive in
their features, while other designs employing innovative liquid and gaseous fuel
forms are only conceptual with little design and performance data available.
Recommendations based on available information are of necessity based heavily
on solid core design and the NERVA/Rover program experience. Although
preliminary recommendations are useful for the innovative designs, further
development of the design concepts must proceed before safety testing
requirements unique to their characteristics can be developed. As the
innovative concepts become more developed, the facility plans and safety testing
issues must be reviewed to identify any additional safety testing requirements.
5.1.2 Recommendations
The safety program should include a task to define and assure completion
of the testing required for flight system safety. This element of the safety
program should focus on data required to assure the safety objectives, as they
apply to the flight systems, will be achieved. These data are necessary to obtain
flight approval. Some of the data identified will also be useful to other major
tasks, such as ground testing of propulsion reactors.
Flight safety tasks can be logically separated into four groupings: launch
phase, operation phase, disposal phase, and inadvertent entry. The list
represents candidate testing that should be considered for the purpose of
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planning test facilities only. This does not represent a recommendation that the
testing will actually be needed for flight approval. Specific designs are required
to establish the actual safety testing requirements.
Candidate Testing to Support Safety Evaluation
A. Launch Phase Safety
1. Critical experiments for accident-caused geometries or introduction of
moderator or reflective material.
2. Core material behavior for solid booster fire environments.
3. Exposure of safety features to launch pad explosion and fire environments.
B. Operational Phase Safety
1. Measurement of inherent core reactivity mechanisms for assuring stable
control.
2. Reliability of control, shutdown, and shutdown cooling features.
3. Demonstration of adequacy of flight system operator interfaces and
operating procedures.
4. Adequacy of instrumentation calibration, reliability and lifetime data.
5. Measurement of fission product release or fission product retention.
6. Transient testing of fuel under design-basis accident conditions.
7. Demonstration of shielding performance including margin to lifetime.
C. Disposal Phase Safety
1. Obtain performance and reliability data on features employed to implement
the disposal plan. Features could include systems for separation of
disposable items or attachment of disposal devices.
2. Reliability of reactor systems required to prepare the core for disposal.
D. Inadvertent Entry
1. Dynamic impact testing of core elements required to retain the function of
assuring subcriticality, acceptable retention of radioactivity, and to assure
functioning for appropriate emergency actions. This would include
features that assure subcriticality on ground or water impact.
2. Testing of features required to assure success of the planned response mode
for inadvertent entry.
3. Testing of features for location and recovery of debris.
5.2 Ground Facility and Eouivvoent Safety
5.2.1 Background
The discussion and recommendations presented here are based on the
intended application of the safety policy to the nuclear propulsion reactor test
facilities, recent SP-100 Nuclear Assembly Test experience, and experience with
ground testing nuclear power and propulsion reactors. Two basic issues have
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been identified: (1) What requirements exist and what requirements should be
developed and applied to assure safety in ground testing of space nuclear
propulsion reactors? and (2) What process should be assumed to be applied in
planning safety reviews of ground testing of nuclear propulsion reactors?
Many types of nuclear reactors are being evaluated for potential use in
space nuclear propulsion. NTP reactor concepts include the use of solid, liquid,
or gaseous nuclear fuel. As previously stated, the solid core concepts are the
most developed, in part, because of the extensive experience from the
NERVA/Rover program. The discussion and recommendations that follow are
based on the issues as they relate to ground testing of solid-fueled nuclear
thermal rocket engines. The recommendations could be applicable to the
gaseous- and liquid-fueled NTP concepts, but issues and recommendations
unique to these concepts could be critical and must wait for more specific
design detail. The recommendations also apply to the NEP reactors except for
the effect of using the open cycle in the NTP. NEP system concepts have
closed reactor coolant systems while the NTP systems use the reactor coolant to
produce thrust and, consequently have open reactor coolant systems. From a
ground test safety standpoint, the open and closed cooling approach is the
singularly significant difference between the NTP and the NEP reactor
concepts. Otherwise the generic safety issues are common to ground testing of
both these propulsion reactor types.
A fundamental safety issue is exposure of people and the environment to
sources of ionizing radiation. Control of the exposure to toxic materials is also
important but does not present a unique safety challenge for the more
developed nuclear propulsion reactor concepts. Safety issues associated with
storage and handling of large quantities of hydrogen reactor coolant will also
need attention but should not present new or unmanagable safety issues. Use of
other reactor coolants may introduce different safety requirements.
Requirements for the control and release of radioactive material during
normal and credible accident conditions have been developed for many types of
ground test reactors. These generally can be applied to the testing of NTP and
NEP reactors. These requirements focus on providing inherent safety design
characteristics that permit control of the reactor with highly reliable sensors and
actuator mechanisms. Features are also provided that assure control of fission
products even if the highly reliable control systems fail. The usual response to
such a postulated failure is to shut down the reactor and cool the nuclear fuel
and structural support so that the reactor remains shutdown and the
radioactivity remains contained or confined. In the US, large commercial power
reactors provide containment that is intended to function in the event of
postulated failure of inherent and engineered safety features. The containment
retains the radioactivity postulated to be released as the result of damage to the
reactor core. The established requirements to implement this approach could
generally be applied to the ground test reactors for NEP application. They
could also be applied to the ground testing of the solid core NTP test reactors;
however, the necessity to exhaust the reactor coolant in an NTP reactor engine
presents a unique area for requirements that have only been considered during
the NERVA/Rover and Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion programs. In the case of
the NEP reactor concepts employing refractory metals that require the vacuum
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conditions of space during operation, a unique requirement exists for vacuum
enclosure of the reactor and its coolant boundary.
Requirements for features to address these unique characteristics must be
developed based on reducing the risk to as low as reasonably achievable. Thus,
the safety design activities must include design efforts that evaluate risk-
reducing design approaches and the practicality of implementing the approaches.
These approaches could feature inherent reactor characteristics, such as nuclear
fuel with a substantial capability for retention of fission products, or they could
use special test facility features such as a shutdown system not intended for use
in the flight system.
The operating duty cycle of nuclear propulsion reactors must be considered
in the safety evaluations. The duty cycle could consist of very short full power
operating times. This duty cycle may allow safety approaches that achieve both
high reliability in safety features and reduced sources of radioactivity and decay
heat.
Testing of space nuclear propulsion reactors will be conducted on
government sites in accordance with DOE orders. The DOE orders provide
requirements and guidance that are generally consistent with the recommended
policy statement. The DOE orders will require some interpretation in applying
them to specific testing. Interpretation of specific details should be done as
part of the process of design development and independent safety review.
Recommendations relative to the more general elements of the DOE orders are
provided in the following sections. (DOE orders regulating safety and
environmental protection are currently being revised and codified.)
5.2.2 Ground Test Facility Recommendations
Safety testing to support safety of ground tests of reactor propulsion
systems should focus on three key functions:
• reliability of safe reactor shutdown
• reliability of safe shutdown heat removal
• control and confinement of radioactive materials during operation and
postulated accidents.
Demonstration of reliability of safety functions could be demanding,
depending on the extent to which components with demonstrated reliability are
used. The reliability demonstration cannot be accomplished on the basis of
large sample statistics. It will require reliability modeling and systematic
evaluation and demonstration of margins relative to identified degradation and
failure mechanisms.
The issue of radiological containment or confinement for postulated severe
accidents requires early attention and must be closely coupled to program
schedule and strategy. Large safety margins potentially provided by
containment for severe accidents can be used to simplify and accelerate safety
evaluations and reviews; however, containment structures can be very expensive.
Although the program must evaluate severe accident events, the short operating
time and the durability of the fuels used in nuclear propulsion reactors may not
demand accident mitigation to achieve the safety objectives. If the physics of
5-4
NSPWG Report
the postulated severe accidents permit demonstration through experimentation
and analysis of adequate radiological confinement, expensive containment
structures may be unnecessary. Nonetheless, regulators could place emphasis on
the issue of radiological confinement for postulated accidents involving severe
core damage. Developers should give careful consideration to potential
mitigative approaches for postulated severe accidents. The selected approach
can only be determined with the knowledge of system design specifics.
Specific test needs will be dependent on the details of the design features
in each system. For the NTP system tests it will be necessary to have data on
fission product release as a function of operating temperature and time. The
safety and environmental constraints on ground testing these reactors may
demand greater retention of radioactivity than for a space flight mission. Fuel
testing for NEP systems will also be required but it is expected to be focused
more on lifetime and functional reliability concerns than on safety validation.
Much of the testing will have to be completed for NEP systems based on SP-
100 fuel. The safety program must provide early focus on demonstration of the
reliability of shutdown and shutdown heat removal functions to support nuclear
system level ground testing.
Ground testing of space nuclear propulsion systems that include nuclear
fuel and the potential for release of radioactive materials or exposure of
personnel to direct radiation should, as a minimum, adhere to existing DOE
orders related to siting and establishment of safety design requirements (DOE
Order 5480.6 [U.S. DOE, 1986] and DOE Order 5480.4 [U.S. DOE, 1984]).
The required application of 10 CFR 50 (U.S. NRC, 1991b), Appendix A
(General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants), in DOE Order 5480.6,
should be interpreted in terms of the more general requirement of 10 CFR
50.34(aX3Xi): that principal design criteria be provided for the facility using 10
CFR 50, Appendix A as guidance. The mandatory requirement for IEEE279,
IEEE308, IEEE603, ANS 15.1 and the ASME BPV Code in DOE Order 5480.4
will also need interpretation when applied to unique equipment associated with
nuclear propulsion test facilities. The exemption provided for space-based
nuclear reactors in DOE Order 5480.6, 8.c. should be interpreted to be
applicable only to flight systems; the exemption should not apply to ground test
reactor facilities for these systems.
The requirement in DOE Order 5480.6 for preparation of safety analysis
reports using NRC guidelines on standard format and content will require
interpretation. Nonetheless, the concept of identifying design-basis accidents
and analyzing these to assure adequate safety margins are implemented in the
design should be retained. The concept should be extended as has been the
practice with most recent safety reviews of power reactors to include analysis of
severe accidents that are lower in probability than the design-basis accidents.
The evaluation of this latter category of accident can be included in a formal
risk analysis and also used in the establishment of a site suitability source term
used in conjunction with meeting the siting requirements of 10 CFR 100 (U.S.
NRC, 1991c) called for in DOE Order 5480.6. The results of these analyses will
have an important role in establishing the extent of the safety features required
to assure safe reactor shutdown, shutdown cooling, and control of the release of
radioactivity.
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Siting requirements and specific facility design requirements should be
established to maintain radiation exposure dose consequence for normal
operations, including anticipated operational occurrence, to levels consistent
with 10 CFR 20 (U.S. NRC, 1991a). Although this is not a mandatory standard
in DOE Order 5480.4, it has been generally adhered to and implements the
NCRP recommendations for occupational and public exposures to radiation.
Application of this guidance to the NTP reactor exhaust may require special
filtering holdup, or location of the exhaust release point.
The requirements for formal review of the Safety Analysis Reports
specified in DOE Order 5481.1B should be applied. Organizations and staff
assigned to complete independent reviews should be identified as soon as
possible so that a competent and comprehensive review can be completed.
_.2.3 TransPortation Eauivment
A certified shipping container which meets DOT and DOE/NRC
regulations will normally be required for the transport of fissile material (e.g.,
fuel, fuel rods, or a complete reactor assembly) between the ground test facility
and the launch site. Although DOE's Safe Secure Trailer (SST) provides
adequate physical security for the transport of fissile materials, it is not
certified to meet the expected requirements for nuclear propulsion reactors and
there are no plans to obtain SST certification as a shipping container. Thus,
although the SST can be used as a carrier, a certified shipping container will
normally be required to ensure its contents will remain subcritical, shielded, and
adequately contained under normal and specified accident conditions.
Certified shipping containers exist that may accommodate the fuel and fuel
forms likely to be used for the spectrum of SEI nuclear propulsion systems
under consideration. Certified shipping containers capable of meeting the
expected transportation safety requirements and capable of accommodating a
full SEI nuclear reactor propulsion assembly have not been identified.
Therefore, unless assembly occurs at the ground test facility and at the launch
site, a container will probably have to be designed and built and then analyzed
and successfully tested to obtain certification before actual use.
Based on this information, the following recommendations are made:
Verify the adequacy and availability of existing certified shipping
containers for the transport of fuel and fuel forms envisioned for SEI
nuclear propulsion systems.
• Because of the demanding certification requirement for nuclear fuel
shipping containers, the program should, as early as practical, evaluate fuel
transportation and loading options to determine shipping container
requirements.
By focusing appropriate, timely attention on the requirements for a specially-
designed and appropriately certified shipping container, the program office can
ensure that this vital equipment will be available for use when needed.
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5.2.4 Launch Facility
Safety procedures must be established, and facility provisions must be
available, at the launch site to ensure that assembly, storage, checkout, testing,
and integration of nuclear propulsion system flight hardware will not pose a
hazard to the public, workers, property, or the environment. Prior to launch,
nuclear propulsion flight hardware must be handled safely and proper shielding
must be provided. Adequate physical security and safeguards must be provided
during the prelaunch phase. As a minimum, storage, checkout, and integration
will be required at the launch site; thus, an adequate facility must be available
at the launch site. The program should focus attention on the requirements for
a special facility at the projected launch site and initiate appropriate actions to
ensure its adequacy and availability for use when needed.
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6. Suggested Future Activities
This section suggests future activities related to safety that should be
considered by the SEI program office. Subsection 6.1 addresses the need for a
safety, quality and reliability program plan and the necessary features of the
plan. In Subsection 6.2, communication with and participation of the public are
discussed with some thoughts on how these activities might be pursued.
6.1 Safety, Quality, and Reliability Program Plans
As one of its first tasks the SEI nuclear propulsion program, in conjunction
with the SEI program office, must develop program plans for safety, quality
assurance, and reliability. These program plans will establish the framework for
implementation of activities important to safety. Program plans for the overall
SEI program should also be developed.
The Safety Program Plan should: (1) establish the scope and importance of
safety to the success of the program, (2) include a concise statement of safety
policy for the program, (3) identify specifically how safety will be managed
within the organizational structure of the program, (4) identify how safety
assessment within the program and independent safety oversight will be
conducted, (5) provide technical safety guidance to permit activities to move
forward and continuously progress, and (6) task the program participants to
develop a Safety Implementation Plan (SIP) for each functional area or activity.
Information provided in this report is directly applicable to items (1), (2),
and (5) identified above; thus, no further discussion of these items is necessary.
Item (3) addresses the mainline safety program. It will involve technical
and safety analysis and reviews routinely conducted by management and staff as
a distinct function. The Safety Program Plan should establish an effective
safety review process within the program for ensuring safety and the ultimate
success of the program. Doing so will help management to focus and maintain
appropriate attention continually on safety throughout the duration of the
program. More specifically, it will provide management with an indispensable
means of obtaining timely, objective programmatic and technical safety
performance assessments. These assessments can serve to verify safety
performance and may guide the redirection of program activities, when
necessary, to achieve safety objectives.
Item (4) identifies two additional safety review functions internal to the
program but outside the mainline structure, namely independent safety
assessment and independent safety oversight. The former primarily involves
technical assessments of mainline safety performance, while the latter is
broader, encompassing both technical and programmatic safety appraisals,
including management performance. Both functions demand objective reporting
of findings and recommendations directly to management. Top management
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must put both of these functions in place specifically for itself while also
authorizing establishment of these functions at lower levels of management.
Well established procedures for independent safety oversight and
environmental review and approval of terrestrial nuclear reactors as well as the
launch of space nuclear systems are in place in the US. These are embodied in
DOE orders for terrestrial reactors and in the Interagency Nuclear Safety
Review Panel process for launch approval of nuclear systems (Sholtis, 1991).
These procedures appear applicable and appropriate for the SEI nuclear
propulsion program. Thus, planning for the independent reviews should be
initiated on the basis of these existing procedures. The objectives of this early
planning should be to confirm the adequacy of these procedures for the SEI
nuclear propulsion program and provide preliminary schedules for the
development work needed to support the safety and environmental approval.
Item (6) involves the development of SIPs. These SIPs are intended to
ensure proper safety focus throughout the SEI Nuclear Propulsion Program. In
particular, they must specify how the program participants are going to execute
their functional activities, and conform with the Safety Program Plan.
6.2 Public Partichmtion
The SEI nuclear propulsion program, in conjunction with the overall SEI
program, should place high priority on the establishment of a plan for public
participation in the nuclear propulsion program. The plan should emphasize
two-way communication between the program and the public on the safety
aspects of nuclear propulsion. Planning should address formal participation
processes, such as public participation in environmental impact statement
activities, as well as informal processes.
Planning for formal communication processes with the public should be
initiated based on use of existing procedures. The objectives of initial planning
should be to confirm or modify these procedures, as appropriate, for the SEI
nuclear propulsion program. Schedules should be established to integrate formal
communication processes with the activities needed to support safety and
environmental approvals.
The initial planning effort for public participation should develop a process
that addresses the need for meaningful public involvement in that the process:
• contributes to safety
provides a forum for two-way communication between the public and the
program
• allows public concerns to be addressed
• improves public understanding of SEI safety
• serves SEI program goals
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Glossary of Terms
Accident--an unplanned event with adverse or potentially adverse consequences.
As Low as Reasonably Achievable (Exposure)--to control or manage exposures
and releases of radioactive material to the environment as low as social,
technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations permit. A
process to attain dose levels as far below acceptable limits as possible.
As Low as Reasonably Achievable (Risk)--to reduce risks to levels as low as
social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations
permit.
Credible (Events or Accidents)--those events or accidents that must be
considered for the system design basis.
Criticality--the operating state of a nuclear reactor where the neutron
population in the reactor remains constant over time.
Critical Items List---a list of component items or technical issues used to focus
program management attention on items that are most important to the
control of safety and reliability risks.
Entry--the event in which a reactor system enters the atmosphere or impacts
the surface of Earth or another celestial body.
Essentially Intact--the state in which a reactor retains sufficient integrity to
maintain subcriticality and keep radioactive fuel, fission products, and
structures together.
Extended Period of Time-_encompassing the time period of potential future
space enterprises in the local region of space under consideration.
Extremely Low Probability Event--an event that is not expected to ever occur
during the execution of the SEI program.
Full Dispersal--the wide-spread scattering of a radioactive material in the
atmosphere as an aerosol such that the consequences on Earth's
environment are insignificant.
Insignificant (radiological consequence on Earth)--much less than the maximum
allowed by terrestrial guidelines.
Local Space Environment--the region of space under consideration.
Low Power Testing--critical operation of a reactor at a sufficiently low power
level to assure generation of only a negligible quantity of radioactive
materials.
Piloted Mission--A space mission carried out with a human crew.
Planned Orbit---an Earth orbit condition, prior to insertion into a interplanetary
or Earth-Lunar trajectory, that has been predetermined to be safe for
reactor start-up operations.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)--the systematic and quantitative
application of logic models (e.g., fault trees and event trees) and analytical
techniques to estimate the probabilities and consequences of undesirable
events.
Risk--a quantitative or qualitative expression of potential harm or damage that
considers both the probability that events will cause harm or damage and
the consequences of those events.
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RovermU.S. nuclear thermal rocket program pursued from the late 1950s
through the early 1970s, including development of the NERVA reactor
concept.
Safeguardsmthose measures or features used to protect nuclear systems and
special nuclear materials from theft, diversion, loss, or sabotage.
Safe----judged to be of sufficiently low risk.
Safety Analysis Report (SAR)----a report that characterizes the level of safety
associated with the use of a reactor system.
Safety Evaluation Report (SER)--report that provides an independent safety
evaluation of a reactor system based, in part, on a review of the SAR.
Safety Functional Requirementsmrequirements delineating specific safety
functions.
Safety Guidelines--suggestions and programmatic guidance for safety.
Safety Policy--a policy that establishes the importance and priority that must be
placed on safety and establishes the broad framework and overall guiding
principles for the development and implementation of an effective nuclear
propulsion safety program.
Shutdown--subcritical by an adequate margin and incorporating positive
measures to ensure that the reactor remains securely subcritical.
Significant---greater than an appropriate guideline or norm.
Space Enterprises--all human-dlrected activities within or dependent upon the
space environment, including satellites, piloted, cargo and robotic space
missions, and other endeavors.
Space Environment---all regions of space beyond of Earth's biosphere, including
other celestial bodies.
Special Nuclear Material (SNM)--plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched
in the isotopes 233 or 235 excluding source material.
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Appendix A. Charter
N¢¢l_ar Safety P0li.e¥ Working Group Charter
NOTE: The NSPWG Panel Membership was changed, with Steering
Committee approval, to include the individuals on the title page of
this report. Also, a draft report on the NSPWG was requested for
September 1991. Both of these changes followed the issuance of the
NSPWG charter.
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Department of Energy
Washington,DC 20545
November 16, 1990
L
Gary L. Bennett
I_nager
Advanced Space Power Systems
NASAHeadquarters
Code RP
t/ashtngton, DC 20546
Dear Gary:
At the recent meeting of the ad hoc Space Nuclear Propuls|on
Steering Committee at NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland,
Ohto, I volunteered DOE to exerctse its basic nuclear safety
responsibility by coordinating an effort to evolve a nuclear
safety po14cy for Space Nuclear Propulsion 4n support of the
Space Exploration Initiative. It was agreed that a technical
panel, with DOE as lead, would be established to develop a
proposed nuclear safety poltcy. Representatives from each of the
.agencies tmuld serve on th|s technical panel.
By copy of this memorandum,the individuals noted below are being
invited to serve on the Nuclear Safety Policy Technical Panel for
SE| Space Nuclear Propulslon.
Chairman: Albert Harsha11 (DOE/H_SNLA)
Vice Chairman: Charles Sawyers, Jr. (NASA/HQ)
Nembers: Alva C. Hardy (NASA/Johnson)
Jim Lee (DOD/SDIO/SNLA)/Jack Walker (DOE/SNLA)
John Rice (DOE/INEL)
Joe Sholt|s, Jr. (USAF/AF1SC/SNR)
George Niederauer (LANL)
Technical Advisor: Nell Brown (GE)
Thts Nuclear Safety Poltcy technical panel is chartered to
develop a recommended nuclear safety poltcy and philosophy for
the SE] Space Nuclear Propulsion Program. The panel should try
to sul:m|t by early next summer(June) a consensus set of spectftc
recommendations. Some of the nuclear safety areas that the panel
should specifically address, subject to current mandatory
regulations and requirements, tnclude top-level policy and
philosophy; principal elements of the general safety criteria;
tmpacts and changes requ|red for manned systems; criteria for
Inadvertent reentry Including subcrtticaltty and tmpact
considerations; approaches for redundancy and/or probabiltsttc
risk; criteria for reactor fission product release; approaches
for operational safety dur|ng ground testtng, launch, startuF,
Figure A-I. Letter from Earl J. Wahlquist, Acting Associate Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Space and Defense Power Systems
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and t'ltght; flight trajectory considerations; safety validation
philosophy with respect to testing and analysis required; and
disposal cr|terta.
Some outside studtes and/or analysis may be required to provide
informed recommendations for someof the proposed acttvtt|es. As
the panel keeps me informed of these needs, !wtll work with the
other ogenctes to make arrangements, to the extent possible, to
provide the necessary funding to support these tctiv|ties.
Completion of thts effort will be an Important milestone tn the
SET Space Nuclear Propulston Program. An approved nuclear safety
policy and approach for thts programmould enable the development
of spec|flc safety requirements. Th|s would permit the first
program phase of more detailed concept defin|ttons end
assessments and crtttcal technology demonstrations to get off to
a quick and more complete start.
S|ncerely,
Earl J. Wahlqutst
Acting Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Space and Defense Power Systems
co:
Nuclear Safety Policy technical panel members
TomMiller, NASA
Roger Lenard, DOO
John Warren, FIE-S2/
Steve Lanes, NE-SO"
Wade Carroll, N[-S2
Figure A-1. Letter from Earl J. Wahlquist, Acting Associate Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Space and Defense Power Systems (Continued)
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Appendix B. Panel Background
Robert A. Bari
Dr. Robert A. Bari is presently Deputy Chairman, Department of Nuclear
Energy, Brookhaven National Lab. Dr. Bari received his AB in physics in 1955
from Rutgers University and his Ph.D. in physics in 1970 from Brandeis
University. Currently, he is responsible for programs on reactor safety, nuclear
safeguards, radiation protection, waste management, nuclear data center, and
advanced nuclear concepts. Since 1974 he has been involved in safety
assessment of commercial, research, and test reactors and other complex
facilities. Previous assignments in nuclear safety at Brookhaven include: Group
Leader (1975-1981); Division Head, 1981; and Associate Department Chairman,
1982-1988. Numerous publications and presentations on probabilistic risk
assessments, severe accident analysis, and safety goals have been published. He
has participated in several international programs on nuclear safety through
OECD, IAEA, and various bilateral agreements. Dr. Bari is a fellow of the
American Nuclear Society and currently Chairman of its Nuclear Reactor Safety
Division.
Mr, Neil W. Brown
Mr. Brown is presently Manager of Safety and Reliability for the SP-100
space reactor project at General Electric. Mr. Brown received his B.S. in
Mechanical Engineering from the University of Washington in 1960 and his
M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Santa Clara in 1968.
He has been employed by General Electric for more than 30 years and has
worked in both the aerospace and terrestrial nuclear power areas. His work in
the nuclear area has focused primarily on advanced nuclear systems. Mr. Brown
participated in safety review and NRC licensing of the Southwest Experimental
Fast Oxide Reactor and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. He has also
contributed safety assessments of both General Electric and DOE studies of the
safety of advanced reactor concepts including liquid metal cooled, gas cooled,
and water and steam cooled reactors. He is a licensed Professional Mechanical
Engineer in the State of California.
Dr. H;Itice S. Cullineford
Dr. Hatice S. Cullingford works as a senior engineer at NASA's Lunar and
Mars Exploration Program Office (LMEPO) located at Johnson Space Center.
Since her Ph.D. and B.S., both in chemical engineering from North Carolina
State University, Dr. Cullingford has worked in space, nuclear, and
environmental systems at NASA, Los Alamos, and the AEC/ERDA/DOE. She
is a registered professional engineer in the state of Texas. Dr. Cullingford's
work began with the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program (Clinch River
Breeder Reactor Project) in reactor system thermal hydraulics, then continued
with plasma engineering and technology development for magnetically confined
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fusion energy and system design studies for laser fusion and hybrid reactors.
She has also been responsible for analysis of hydrogen systems, pressurized
water reactor safety, and alternative concepts for replacement production
reactors. Dr. Cullingford has been active at NASA in both project and program
management. Her contributions include technology development and
demonstration, conceptual designs, and simulation models of environmental
control and life support for the space station and missions to the Moon and
Mars. Dr. Cullingford's current responsibilities include risk management and
system engineering for SEI. Hatlce has been recognized for her long-term and
strategic planning achievements at both ERDA and JSC. She has produced
three (one pending) patents and authored about 50 papers and reports.
Mr, Alva C. H#rdy
Mr. Hardy is employed at NASA/JSC/Space and Life Sciences/Solar
System Exploration Division/Space Science Branch. He serves as Radiation
Subsystem Manager for Space Shuttle dosimetry and technical manager of the
NASA Johnson Space Center efforts in Space Shuttle and Space Station ionizing
radiation analysis for crew safety. He received his B.S. in physics and
mathematics in 1962 from Southwestern Oklahoma State University. Mr. Hardy
has been with NASA Houston since 1962, with twenty-six years experience
involved with ionizing radiation analysis and dosimetry activities for NASA
manned space programs, primarily dealing with radiation issues related to flight
crew safety. Mr. Hardy provides a basic understanding of the NASA Astronaut
Ionizing Radiation Risk Limitation System for Space Activities, including
regulatory/legal requirements, current ground rules and constraints and concerns
for advanced program applications.
Mr, Albert C. Marshall
Mr. Marshall is presently employed at Sandia National Laboratories and
serves as the Safety Advisor for Space Reactor Systems for the Department of
Energy. His current responsibilities also include a part-time faculty assignment
at the University of New Mexico in the Department of Chemical and Nuclear
Engineering and space reactor work for Sandia National Laboratories. Mr.
Marshall received a B.S. in Physics in 1965 and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering
in 1967, both from the Pennsylvania State University. He has twenty-two years
work experience in the area of nuclear reactor systems at Sandia National
Laboratories, General Atomics, and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory. He has
worked primarily in the areas of reactor physics, reactor design and analysis,
and reactor safety for a broad variety of reactor types and applications. He was
project leader for two large and complex in-core experimental programs to
explore both light-water-cooled reactor and liquid-metal-cooled reactor severe
core damage accident phenomenology. Mr Marshall was the lead staff member
for a comparative assessment of space reactors and has eight years of work
experience in the area of space reactors.
Dr, Willi#m H, McCulloch
Dr. McCulloch is presently a distinguished member of the technical staff at
Sandia National Laboratories. He currently is responsible for reactor safety for
advanced nuclear power systems. Dr. McCulloch received a B.S. in Engineering
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Physics in 1963, an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering in 1964, and a Ph.D. in
Mechanical Engineering from Texas Tech University in 1964. He is also a
registered professional engineer in the state of New Mexico and has received
numerous recognitions for outstanding achievements. He has worked at Sandia
National Laboratories since 1967 primarily in the areas of Heat Transfer and
Systems Analysis, Solar Energy Projects, Light Water Reactor Safety and Space
Nuclear Systems. In 1975, he was assigned from Sandia to the ERDA (now the
DOE) Division of Solar Energy. He served on the Interagency Nuclear Safety
Review Panel Power Systems Subpanel of the Galileo mssion and chaired the
subpanel for the Ulysses mission. Dr. McCuUoch has authored or co-authored
more than 30 technical publications.
Dr. George F. Niederauer
Dr. Niederauer is currently SP-100 Project Safety Manager at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. Dr. Niederauer received his B.S. in 1964 in Mathematics
and his M.S. in Nuclear Engineering in 1966 from the South Dakota School of
Mines and Technology. In 1967 he received his Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering
from Iowa State University. He has experience with computer code
development and analysis of light water reactors and liquid metal cooled
reactors in the areas of reactor physics, kinetics, thermal hydraulics, and heat
transfer. Management responsibilities included groups involved in computer
code development for safety analysis, reactor simulators and real time
monitoring, safety analysis of reactor systems and containment, and risk
assessment. He has also been employed at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory,
NASA Lewis Research Center, Aerojet Nuclear Company, and Energy
Incorporated.
Mr, Kerry Remp
Mr. Remp is currently the Deputy Chief of the Safety Assurance Office,
NASA Lewis Research Center. Responsibilities include management of systems
safety activities for all NASA Lewis Research Center spaceflight, terrestrial and
facility programs, including nuclear propulsion, Space Station Freedom power
system and numerous satellite and experimental programs. Mr. Remp received
his B.S. in Marine Engineering, with a minor in Nuclear Engineering in 1982
from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. Some of his achievements to date
include: Development and review of safety requirements for the
NASA/DOE/DOD joint Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) program; review of
construction and operational aspects of numerous U.S. nuclear power generation
plants, including extensive experience at Perry Nuclear Power Plant; member of
hydrostatic testing team for the H.B. Robinson nuclear power plant; and
development of safety and quality assurance training programs for numerous
nuclear power plants managed by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company.
Mr. John W. Rice
Mr. Rice is currently the Nuclear Safety Support Program Specialist at
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Mr. Rice received his M.S. in Nuclear
Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology in 1975. During his
Air Force career he was Nuclear Weapon Safety Officer at the Air Force
Weapons Laboratory, Nuclear Weapon Safety Officer at HQ Strategic Air
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Command, and Space Nuclear Safety Officer at the Air Force's Inspection and
Safety Center's Directorate of Nuclear Surety (AFISC/SN). While at AHSC/SN,
he was also responsible for nuclear safety approval for Air Force launches of
minor radioactive sources and Executive Secretary for the Interagency Nuclear
Safety Review Panel for NASA's Galileo space mission. More recently, Mr.
Rice was the Nuclear Safety Program Specialist at IN-EL for the Multimegawatt
Space Reactor Project Integration Support Office.
Mr, J. ¢_harles Sawyer. Jr.
Mr. Sawyer is presently assigned to the NASA Headquarters Safety
Division in the Office of Safety and Mission Quality (Code Q) as the NASA
Headquarters Level I Safety Manager for the Space Station Freedom Program,
for the Space Exploration Initiatives and for the Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Previously he was the Level I Payload Safety Manager, dealing with the payload
safety aspects of payloads such as Galileo, Ulysses, Hubble Space Telescope,
TelemeterF Date Relay Satellite, and Magellan. In previous assignments Mr.
Sawyer was the Director of Range Safety at the USAF Armament Division at
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida where he was responsible for the development of
range safety policies and criteria for approximately 600 test and evaluation
programs, which included the US Navy Tomahawk, the US Army Hellfire, the
USAF Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM), the AGM-
13C, and several types of laser- and television-guided bombs. Prior to
accepting the position as Director of Range Safety, Mr. Sawyer was a Range
Safety Analyst at the Armament Division and at the Pacific Missile Test Center
at Point Mugu, CA, where he developed range safety criteria for many of the
early tactical and strategic weapons systems, scientific sounding rockets and
participated in several of the Nuclear Readiness-to-Test Exercises at Johnston
Atoll as a member of Joint Test Force 8. Mr. Sawyer holds a B.S. in
Mechanical Engineering (aerospace option) from the University of California,
Berkeley, and a M.S. in Systems Management from the University of Southern
California. He is a graduate of the USAF Air War College.
Lt Col Josenh A. ShQltis, Jr.
Lt Col Joseph A. Sholtis, Jr., is Chief of the Analysis and Evaluation
Branch, Nuclear Power and Sources Division, Directorate of Nuclear Surety, Air
Force Safety Agency, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, overseeing Air Force
terrestrial and U. S. aerospace nuclear power projects from a safety standpoint.
From March 1984 to August 1987, while assigned to Air Force Element, U.S.
Department of Energy, Lt Col Sholtis served as the Program Manger of the
joint DOD/DOE/NASA SP-100 Space Reactor Power System Development
Program. From August 1980 to March 1984, he served as Chief, Radiation
Sources Division and Reactor Facility Director at the Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland. He has supported
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) evaluations of the Viking,
LES 8/9, and Voyager missions employing Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTGs), chaired the INSRP Power System Subpanel for the RTG-
powered Galileo and Ulysses space missions, served as the DOD INSRP
Coordinator for the Ulysses mission, and served as a technical expert on the
United Nations Working Group on Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space. He
has also followed development of the Soviet Romashka and Topaz space
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reactors. He holds a B.S. from the Pennsylvania State University and an M.S.
from the University of New Mexico in Nuclear Engineering. He is a member
of the faculty of the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences and has
authored/co-authored one textbook, one handbook, and more than sixty
technical publications.
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